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"De Sade, a Pessimistic Libertine." In Jan Bremmer, ed., From Sappho to De Sade: Moments in the History of Sexuality. London: Routledge. , PDF | On Jan 1, , G. Hekma and others published Sex, Sade en sadisme | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. Sex Sade in Milano, reviews by real people. Yelp is a fun and easy way to find, recommend and talk about what's great and not so great in Milano and beyond.

PDF | On Jan 1, , G. Hekma and others published Sex, Sade en sadisme | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. During the eighteenth century, new ideals, theories, and practices of masculinity and sexuality developed in the countries of Northwestern Europe. This article. Sex has received little attention in the history of western philosophy, and The Marquis de Sade (a philosopher of sorts) went to the opposite.

PDF | On Jan 1, , G. Hekma and others published Sex, Sade en sadisme | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. Sex Sade in Milano, reviews by real people. Yelp is a fun and easy way to find, More Info. Hours, Parking, Accepted Cards, Price. Sex Sade in Milano, reviews by real people. Yelp is a fun and easy way to find, recommend and talk about what's great and not so great in Milano and beyond.

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See all. Elvira cape sexsadeboutique sexsade lingerie cape lace fringe shake. This satisfies the conditions for a supererogatory act, but it is doubtful that X performs one.

The presence of sexual desire and the prospect of sexual pleasure lower the degree of the supererogation, if not entirely nullifying it. This is not parallel to other cases of supererogation, in which no additional motive to wanting to help someone exists. This might affect its supererogatory status. Thus, risk to the agent might not be sufficient; perhaps the agent must also lack the sexual desire for the action or find it undesirable.

The degree of supererogation increases in direct proportion to that of undesirability. As awful as it sounds, this fits with the type of cases that would come to mind in thinking of supererogation: sex with the least physically desirable. But there is room for subjectivity: a young gay man not attracted to other young men would find sex with them undesirable, so having sex with one out of kindness would be supererogatory in his case.

This is true at a general level because the same general moral features e. But it might be false at more specific levels: sexual violation of the body by a penis or an object makes the violation distinct.

This has to do with how one experiences sexual bodily violations, thereby making sexual consent a crucial moral aspect of sexual relations Wertheimer — Moreover, if Kant is right, the objectifying nature of sexual desire makes it unique.

Consent is crucial because a it transforms an otherwise wrong act into a permissible one though not necessarily to a good act ; b in heterosexual sex, men and women might importantly differ when it comes to sex; and c sexual violation is typically experienced as very harmful Wertheimer — Yet the sufficiency of consent can be questioned.

If, for example, sexual desire by nature objectifies, as the Kantian view has it, then the consent of the parties is insufficient—they consent to a wrong action see below. The theory of New Natural Law considers only marital sex—which it understands as referring to sex acts between married partners who do it from the specific motive of the good of marriage what this means, though, is unclear —is morally permissible even good.

New Natural Law is a version of any type of view that limits the morality of sexual acts to specific domains. In addition to marriage, love is another such domain. It requires only the presence of love. Other versions require only affection or a mutually respectful relationship Hampton ; Nussbaum On such views, consensual casual sex between two strangers is impermissible. But why must such factors be present for the permissibility of sex? One prominent reason is that sex is somehow morally dangerous, so something is needed to minimize from or erode this danger.

Sex might make us treat our sexual partners as objects, and the power of sex might make us engage in sex with the wrong people, in the wrong circumstances, etc. Love or a respectful relationship minimizes these risks Nussbaum — But if sex is objectifying, love or a respectful relationship might not prevent this objectification; lovers or partners to a relationship end up objectifying each other Soble b: — Moreover, if sex is so powerful or mind-numbing, being in a relationship might not make this power any less effective: partners soon start eyeing people outside the relationship.

The argument must assume that being in a relationship turns off sexual desire for other people. There is also the thought that relationships do not escape the power of desire: people often have sex with each other prior to initiating a relationship. A second type of reason against the sufficiency of consent is harm. Setting aside harm to third parties, if sexual activity leads to harm to one or more of its parties, then consent is not sufficient. This view might be plausible especially when it comes to women, given that many women engage in consensual sex but motivated by nonsexual desires, such as not wanting to put their partner in a foul mood.

The harm is psychological, especially to their autonomy West This implies that prostitutes are harmed women because of their consent to undesired sex, an implausible implication. Put this way, the argument sounds plausible: there is no good reason to deny that harmful sexual acts are wrong in that respect. One might object that this argument is paternalistic, telling people not to engage in sex when the sex is harmful Soble 37— This objection is true in that harmful sex gives the participants a reason to not engage in it, although it cannot be used to argue that social or legal forces should prevent this action Wertheimer — Each case has universal participant consent, yet each sexual act is wrong in some aspect though not all are seriously wrong because it exhibits a vice: unprofessional, intemperate, malicious and possibly cruel and demeaning; cf.

Morgan a , vain, and cowardly, respectively. The necessity of consent is often taken for granted by philosophers. But this can be questioned. For instance, viewing sexual activity and pleasure as casual might render consent unnecessary in some cases Benatar Indeed, a parent might want to instill in their child the ability to be sexually experienced, so might coerce the child into sex on occasion, much like parents coerce their children into activities deemed good for them Benatar — Thus, consent might not always be necessary.

Briefly put, if sexual activity is trivial, sexual consent would not be important or as important as we think. But then promiscuity and casual sex cannot be easily defended on liberal grounds, and a significance view of sex—that sex is a serious matter—is correct Benatar — Thus, if the liberal is to accept the significance view of sex, she must shield casual sex and promiscuity from moral censor.

One day, X discovers that some people have entered her apartment and used it to entertain themselves. X feels justifiably violated, indicating that the violation of private spaces is a serious wrong. This explains why sexual violations are experienced as deeply traumatic Wertheimer ch. Brogaard — Another strategy is to reject a single view of sexual pleasure as either casual or significant and argue that, depending on between whom the pleasure occurs, it might or might not be casual.

But even if or when sex is significant, it does not follow that it must be experienced only in the context of love, deep affection, etc. What follows instead is that consent is necessary. Thus, sex may be casual or promiscuous, as long as consent is secured. Objectification is a perennial issue in the philosophy of sex. Indeed, sexual desire might not be necessary for the claim that a woman is sexually objectified under patriarchy: a man need not sexually desire a woman to catcall her.

Sexual objectification is treating or considering a person only as a sex object. Casual sex, watching pornography, catcalling, ogling, and other examples all allegedly involve sexual objectification. It is unclear whether objectification can consist of mere mental regard or whether it must have a treatment component ogling someone is interesting because it is unclear whether it is treatment or mere regard.

The inclusion of regard is wise because objectification seems to involve mere attitudes and perceptions e. X then sexually objectifies Y if, and only if, X treats or regards Y only as a sexual object.

The importance of objectification stems from a view of human beings as more than objects LeMoncheck ch. If human beings, regardless of individual merit, have elevated moral status in virtue of having rationality, dignity, autonomy, or some such property, reducing someone to a lower level is wrong.

But how common the actual occurrence of sexual objectification and how serious it is, are additional questions. It seems rare to treat our sexual partners as mere objects in any obvious and troubling ways: not only are we aware of their humanity, we are also attentive to it.

Langton — —only instrumentality is common. Others, such ownership and denial of subjectivity, seem rare Halwani a. Clear cases of sexual objectification include sexually-motivated rape and catcalling. The Kantian view is that sexual desire objectifies by its nature and makes it impossible for the sexual partners to satisfy the Categorical Imperative. Equally problematic on this view is X objectifying him or herself —more accurately, allowing him or herself to be objectified by Y.

Indeed, self-objectification is what makes the view particularly Kantian Soble b: In almost every interaction with each other, we are interested in some ability, talent, or service that another can perform, an aspect intimately connected to their rationality. Only with sexual desire and, Kant says, in the rare case of cannibalism; [ —63] does X desire Y as a body, as an object. X wants to enjoy Y herself , not her beautiful voice, her massaging abilities, etc.

Sexual desire renders people objects by reversing our normal relationship with their bodies. Their bodies become the objects, not the instruments, of our attention. Kant thought that only marriage can make objectification tolerable, though his argument is implausible Kant [ ]; see Soble b, b; Denis ; Wertheimer — Consent is thus not sufficient for permissible sex because consenting to sex is consenting to objectification, to something wrong Soble b: — Vannoy Sexual desire seems also powerful: its pull is strong and its voice loud, insisting, and persistent, so much so that people do irrational and immoral things to satisfy it.

Of course, sexual partners normally observe limits on how they treat each other: they do not violate each other, treat each other literally as objects, and so on, exactly because they understand that they may not treat people in such ways. Thus, sexual desire operates within moral red lines. The Kantian problem of objectification cannot be easily solved. Arguing that there is no objectification because human beings have no special moral status from which they can be lowered Soble 53—63 does not meet Kant on his own grounds as Soble insists in b.

Claiming that parties to the sexual act normally consent to it Mappes , that objectification is okay as long as the relationship is respectful Nussbaum esp.

Two other options are to accept the problem as a problem but perhaps minimize it; Halwani a or to argue that sexual desire among human beings is not always objectifying. This is not merely the idea, insisted on by the intentional view, that sexual desire in human beings is complex, because a Kantian view of sex can accommodate this point, but that. Even the elements in sexual desire closest to this are combined, at least in healthy people, with other elements of human emotion that radically transform their meaning.

Wood For example, X might sexually desire Y because Y is, among other things, a kind person, such that X would not have desired Y otherwise. Nonetheless, the above idea that sexual desire can be combined with healthy emotions makes it possible that sexual desire is not always toxic, though how remains unclear. To succeed, sexual desire needs to be injected with healthy emotions, and not merely added to them, so that its nature changes on particular occasions.

On the Kantian view, not all sexual activity is objectifying: any sexual activity not stemming from sexual desire might not be objectifying. Even in those cases when sexual activity is objectifying, its seriousness varies: in consensual encounters it is drowned by other moral factors, whereas in sexually motivated rape it is very serious as sexual desire is the primary motive.

The motive is not to sexually objectify someone, as this is rare; instead, X regards Y in a way that is sexually objectifying. Moreover, it is unclear how sexual objectification differs between men and women, especially if men and women experience sex differently. Men experience sexual desire more frequently and insistently than women, though both are similar in their enjoyment of sexual activity Ogas and Gaddam chs.

Thus men might engage in more sexual objectification than do women given that men think about sex more, ogle others more, and are more easily turned on visually. Since during sexual activity both would sexually objectify each other roughly equally, men would sexually objectify women overall more than women would men. Men also consume pornography straight and gay far more than women do, so would engage in much more sexual objectification than do women by viewing people on-screen, by viewing people as mere sexual objects, etc.

But these claims seem unconvincing. Nor does pornography seem to send messages about the status of women, whether about the depicted women or women in general. But pornography enables the sexual objectification of women by displaying them to the gaze of the male viewer ditto for men in pornography, albeit the gay gaze. This form of objectification seems innocuous, as long as it is not implicated in harm towards women, either individually or as a class Gruen ; see also Eaton It eroticizes patriarchal ways of viewing women, so that sexual desire becomes infused with dominance cf.

Morgan a: — The sexual desires of young men who routinely consume pornography become desires for the sexual domination of women.

Moreover, insofar as it is an empirical view, no proper evidence has been marshalled in its support Diorio ; Tarrant Sexual desire, as we have seen, is sufficient for objectification. However, it is not necessary. The guy catcalling a woman to feel part of the group is an example, and so are pornography directors and editors, who, by choosing the angle of the camera and the footage cuts, help sexually objectify the performers by presenting them to the viewer in particular ways; similar reasoning applies to, say, brothel owners.

This might be the most pernicious form of sexual objectification in that social forces direct or pressure not necessarily force women to adopt such self-identifications or self-presentations to lead better lives, though whether they are actually flourishing is harder to gauge. Cahill 32; see also Consider a closeted gay man who catcalls a woman only to impress his peers.

He objectifies her but does not seem derivatize her. Sexual perversions are then standing preferences for sexual activity that does not involve such multi-levels of sexual arousal. Thus, it is inaccurate to accuse it of being sexless Solomon or to evaluate it by giving examples of non-complex sexual acts Kupfer It also misunderstands how perversions usually work: a coprophiliac does not normally desire sex with feces, but to incorporate feces in his sexual act with another, which could involve multi-levels of perception.

Similar views rely on the idea that natural sexual desire is interpersonal, such as that it culminates in love Scruton ch. A non-psychological account of sexual perversion, one closer to folk biology, claims that only reproduction allows us to distinguish perversions from non-perversions Ruddick ; cf.

Gray The account might have implausible implications, however. Anyone who prefers heterosexual oral sex to intercourse would be perverted.

Moreover, any heterosexual couple that incorporate fetish objects, urine, feces, and so on, in their sexual intercourse would be sexually natural Gray —; Primoratz 53— Indeed, coprophilia can sink all the above accounts: two people who exhibit inter-personal attitudes in the form of multi-level perceptions, and who have sexual intercourse of the reproductive type, communicating healthy emotions sincerely, yet use feces in their activity would counter-intuitively not be perverted on any of the above accounts.

Thus, some philosophers have proposed to get rid of the concept altogether Priest ; Primoratz ch. But this view seems to set the bar too high for what counts as non-perverted. A good account of perversion might have to be prescriptive, capturing the core of perversion but not necessarily capturing all our beliefs about it it should explain why our beliefs are mistaken when they are.

Furthermore, it will likely be a psychological account, a preference to have sex with or involving certain types of object that are anti-life, such as bodily waste and corpses, and that are biologically odd, such as inter-species sexual intercourse. Evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology would have to play crucial roles.

What is the value of sex? How important or valuable! Procreation, love, and pleasure as types, not tokens are obvious answers to the first question. Sex is usually the way to procreate, so sex is valuable insofar as procreation is valuable.

There is also anti-natalism Schopenhauer , ch. The value of sex in regards to procreation is thus precarious. Still, if sex leads to the settled stage of love via the passionate one , it is valuable for that. Does sex have intrinsic value? If it does, it is probably sexual pleasure, as-sensation or as-enjoyment, a pleasure that provides people with the main motive for having sex, often with drastic consequences.

So then how valuable is the pleasure of sex? Perhaps we should regard our appetite for sex like we do that for food to avoid obsessing about it Russell [ ]. But can we go further? People spend much time pursuing projects and activities they enjoy or consider worthwhile. Some do only when time, work, or family time permit, and some do much of the time they are, say, independently wealthy.

Writing, pursuing Hollywood or Bollywood stardom, playing chess, swimming, traveling, and, of course, building a family are examples. Other than philosophical far-fetched examples of worthless pursuits counting blades of grass, collecting bottle caps , most projects and activities have some worth, unless we wish to condemn most human beings of having worthless lives.

Perhaps some projects are more worthwhile than others though how to argue for this is not easy , but almost all have some worth, and an intellectual one at that, including watching reality television or reading junk fiction Carroll esp. I am young, moderately good-looking, and, with current technology e. I enjoy sex, and it makes me feel good. In between bouts of sex, I can see friends, go to the gym, movies, whatever. But my deepest enjoyment—my life-plan, to use philosophical jargon—is to pursue the pleasures of sex.

Is there something we can say to prove X wrong, especially if X has the talent for something considered more important? Perhaps we can claim that pursuing sex is not as worthy as reading Russian literature, but even here we are on insecure ground. But this underestimates the reliance on intellect in sexual pursuits or presumes that such use is unimportant. But this would rule out many a life as good.

One can argue that there are more important things in life than pursuing sexual pleasure. But X need not live without friends, family, and other important things present in normal lives. But unless one were a die-hard Kantian, the objectification involved in sex can be redeemed by other factors. But X can have affectionate sexual relationships with others, and friendships, etc.

Even casual hookups have their bonding aspects. Thomas But note how the affirmation and satisfaction here can as easily apply to passionate yet love-less sex. Thus, even if pursuing sexual pleasure is not as intellectually stimulating as reading classical Arabic poetry, it is not worthless, whether intellectually or non-intellectually, and it is on a par with many other pursuits that people undertake that are far from having intellectual depth.

Soble 58— The following anthologies are crucial resources for someone studying the field of the philosophy of sex. The following abbreviations were used above. Conceptual Issues 1. Normative Issues 2. Unlike appetites, sexual interest … [is] … an interpersonal sensitivity, one that enables us to delight in the mind and character of other persons as well as in their flesh… [S]ex may be seen as an instinctual agency by which persons respond to one another through their bodies.

More generally, and accounting for sexual pleasures not located in the genitals, sexual pleasure is the sort of bodily pleasure experienced in the sexual parts of the body, or at least related to those parts in that if it is associated with arousal, the arousal occurs in those parts. Primoratz 46 To distinguish a sexual from a nonsexual kiss, we ask which of the two is associated with arousal, and we understand the notion of arousal as essentially linked to the sexual body parts.

Is sexual activity like any other activity in that the same moral rules apply to it? Goldman This is true at a general level because the same general moral features e.

A third type of reason relies on virtues and vices. Consider the following examples. They have sex during which Lisa heaps verbal abuse on the trembling-with-desire Nancy. At the end of the day, all spent, he agrees to a seventh hookup because the guy is a catch. The Value of Sex What is the value of sex? Now consider X , whose life project is the pursuit of sexual pleasures. X says, I am young, moderately good-looking, and, with current technology e.

Thomas 59 But note how the affirmation and satisfaction here can as easily apply to passionate yet love-less sex. Bibliography Abbreviations for Classic Anthologies The following anthologies are crucial resources for someone studying the field of the philosophy of sex. PoS2: second edition, Alan Soble ed. PoS3: third edition, Alan Soble ed. PoS4: fourth edition, Alan Soble ed.

Stewart ed. Elliston eds , Wininger, and Frederick A. Aquinas, —, Summa contra gentiles , English Dominican Fathers trans. Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics , Terence Irwin trans. Wreen and Donald M. Buss, David M. Cahill, Ann J. Corvino, John ed.

Eaton, A. Hurley trans. Strachey trans. Wardle, Mark Strasser, William C. George, Robert P. Goldman, Alan H. Mohanty, and Paula M. Moya eds. Snow ed. Zalta ed. Hill, Judith M. Gregor trans. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, Gagnon, Robert T. Lee, Patrick and Robert P. Longino, Helen E. Mappes and James S.

Zembaty ed. Meston, Cindy M. Reprinted in PoS7: — Reprinted in PoS6: — Reprinted in PoS5: —; PoS6: — Nehemas and P. Woodruff in Plato: Complete Works , J.